



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>


NYPL RESEARCH LIBRARIES



3 3433 06923802 4

The Thread of Life

*H·R·H·Eulalia
Infanta of Spain*




(Enalia)

SB



Emilia)

SB





— — —

The Thread of Life

BY


COMTESSE DE AVILA

(H. R. H. EULALIA
INFANTA OF SPAIN)

[*Authorized translation from the original French*]



NEW YORK
DUFFIELD & COMPANY
1912
5 G.



Copyright 1911 by H. R. H. Eulalia, Infanta of Spain

Copyright 1912 by Duffield & Company



Contents

	PAGE
PREFACE - - - - -	7
GENERAL CAUSES OF HAPPINESS - - - - -	13
THE TRAINING OF THE WILL - - - - -	23
HONESTY - - - - -	31
FRIENDSHIP - - - - -	39
DIVORCE - - - - -	51
THE FAMILY - - - - -	65
THE COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE OF WOMAN - - - - -	73
THE WAR UPON FEMINISM - - - - -	83
THE EQUALIZATION OF CLASSES THROUGH EDUCATION - - - - -	93
SOCIALISM - - - - -	101
THE WORKING CLASSES - - - - -	109
SERVANTS - - - - -	117

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOLS	- - - - -	129
THE NECESSITY OF RELIGION AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON THE PEOPLE	- - - - -	139
THE PRESS	- - - - -	149
MORALITY	- - - - -	159
THE FEAR OF RIDICULE	- - - - -	167
PUBLIC OPINION	- - - - -	175
PREJUDICE	- - - - -	183
JUDGMENT	- - - - -	191
MORAL COURAGE	- - - - -	199
TRADITION	- - - - -	207
CRITICISM	- - - - -	215
THE DANGER OF EXCESSIVE ANALYSIS	-	221
THE LAW OF COMPENSATION	- - - - -	229





Preface



PREFACE no matter how short must be placed at the head of this book that mirrors my ideas. I must especially put my readers on their guard against misinterpreting the motives which have prompted me to write it.

In publishing these pages and setting forth my opinions in them I have not had the wish to produce a work of literature; I have not aimed at any monument of erudition, nor striven to impose on other people my different point of view.

As a spectator, near enough to the social questions of the day to be familiar with every argument concerning them, and still far enough away to analyse them calmly and impartially judge them, I can give testimony untrammeled by any preconceived opinions. It has occurred to me that this testimony, which from its very nature must be exact and of a net value, may be of interest to those in all classes of society who are trying to gather into shape the thousands upon thousands of incongruous and contradictory elements upon which lessons for the present as well as for the future must be founded.

I want to say, too, that if I preserve an incognito on the cover of my book it is not timidity, but a sentiment of modesty that prompts me. I object to profiting by public curiosity on the subject of my personality. On the other hand I wish to sign this necessary preamble, because I have never feared

criticism, and because, all my life, I have never lacked moral courage.


Those who are good enough to peruse the short chapters of this book will soon see that they have been written with the sincere conviction that I have always shown in the expression of my ideas and opinions or the accomplishment of anything I have freely and independently taken up.

I simply beg my readers to excuse any “defects of form,” and to believe that I have tried to redeem them by a loyal accent.

EULALIA,

Infanta of Spain.





*The Usual Causes
of Happiness*







The Usual Causes of Happiness

STHE most imperious spring of all human endeavor is the desire for happiness. Yet it is difficult, however the primordial desire for felicity is instinctive in us, to attain to happiness if one makes the search for it the main object of one's life.

To know how to live is an art about which philosophers, scientists, and metaphysicians teach us little; the first, because they ignore the meaning of life in order to show us its end; the second, because they constitute

themselves rational theorists; and the last, because they pretend to lift the veil from what lies beyond.

One thing is certain, that life is worth living, and that in order to live it happily one must know how to extract a relative amount of happiness from it.

In no way more than by appreciating the delights and pleasures, small though they be, which every moment of the day brings us, can we create a real source of happiness, for from such appreciation comes what is usually called "the joy of living," that great principle of all happy natures.

Unfortunately, in most cases, man does not clearly see the path that leads to happiness, because he looks for it in the immediate and complete gratification of his desires, in material or intellectual pleasures to which he attaches an exaggerated value; in superfluity, in possessions, in everything that causes him to mistake for happiness what in

reality is nothing but enjoyment linked with fear and danger and regret.

One must, above all things, simplify the circumstances of happiness. A simple idyll, for example, is the most exquisite type of love story; it is, in other words, the symbol of perfection in the amorous sentiment. Simplicity in regard to personal tastes, affections, daily acts, is the greatest secret of happiness and of love.

If it were justifiable to give ourselves only partial and transitory gratifications, we should, according to our natures, be able to build happiness on these flimsy foundations. Fortune is unstable; fame, no matter how attained, is effaced by time; glory is an empty word; health becomes impaired, and misfortune and unhappiness follow whenever the greatest pleasure has not lain in constant aspiration toward the true, the beautiful and the good.

But still this aspiration must spring from

the cultivation of our moral *ego* in all simplicity. Happiness lies within ourselves; and it is only by the ethical development of our personality that we can wholly round it out, and make it the sweet companion of our days.

Is it not true that in love, if one is guided by one's heart, one is much happier than if guided by reason? The same rule holds good in material existence; reduced to simplicity, to the normal cultivation of our faculties, we gain a greater share of happiness than could be gotten from excesses. Vice of any kind yields only momentary gratification, tinged with bitterness even at the moment.

But how shall we set to work to develop a moral personality? In the first place by educating ourselves, and next by the selection of congenial friends. Every one who knows his own aspirations, should surround himself with people whose sentiments con-

form to his. Painful jars and regrettable shocks may be thus avoided, and battles from which even the most stout and combative natures cannot escape without wounds, fatigue, and disgust.

If you are obliged to live in a country different from your own, or amid surroundings the mentality of which does not correspond to the trend of your spirit, look the situation coolly in the face: learn to be by turns the wise preceptor and the willing disciple; by doing this you will be understood and appreciated, and preserve intact your inward peace.

One must learn how to pass through moral and intellectual atmospheres as one passes through the atmospheres of the physical world. Just as you wear the costume that is seasonable, so your soul must wear the costume that is most appropriate to its surroundings. Many people are afraid to live: they are thrown into despair by the slightest

failure. They fence about as if in fear of ambush, irritated or disconcerted constantly by their mistakes. Remember that no circumstance can weigh you down or frustrate your enjoyment of life if your happiness is a matter of inward contentment, a support of the spirit that can be acquired in spite of the worst misfortunes or catastrophes. As inward happiness proceeds from a state of mind produced by education, by the cultivation of simplicity, and the adaptation of oneself to uncongenial surroundings, so it is necessary to obey these laws if one would steer his bark skilfully through the shoals of life and know the supreme joy of living.

In the declining years of life one who has followed such precepts as these can look back serenely upon his past, for he will have extracted all possible happiness from everything, and will know that he has never willingly done an injury. With infinite tranquility, above all if he has known too, as

he will have known, how to cultivate the love of nature, with its charm and eternal grace, he may without fear come near the gates of death and see them open before him.



The Training of the Will



The Training of the Will

SHE will is the faculty of deciding freely upon certain things. But for the will always to obey a noble aim, it must be carefully trained to weigh opposing impulses and motives.

Ribot says: "*I will* indicates a situation, but does not constitute one." To such a situation character, which is nothing more nor less than the power of the will, must contribute something also. And character must be formed by progressive education and constant cultivation of personality.

A man must stamp directness of purpose on everything he does, and show his character by his deeds.

The training of the will is indispensable throughout life, if only to do away with useless effort, and give us clear vision morally, to make us master of ourselves, teach us to persevere in whatever we take up, to go directly at our purpose. Considered in this light, the will becomes of prime importance in the life of the individual, and constitutes one of the most powerful forces in the world—free and voluntary action controlled by sound judgment.

If you train your will, and follow *goodness, beauty, and justice*, you will never undertake an intellectual work at a time when inauspicious circumstances curb you, you will never let a task remain unfinished, you will never carry out a purpose to an uncertain end.

The immortal Guyau has said: "He who does not act in accordance with what he thinks, thinks but imperfectly." For in order to think perfectly it is necessary that an idea be solidly supported by judgment, and judgment comes from the training of the will.

Let us make no mistake, this training furnishes us with invaluable energy. After considering well what one is going to do, foreseeing consequences, measuring the usefulness of the undertaking, after having adjusted the action to the end in view, one should freely obey his own will; then, especially if it be lighted at a moral fire, he may assume in full consciousness and serenity all responsibility for his act.

The idea of responsibility implies that the individual will is responsible to itself, face to face. From the moment the will is taken in hand and trained we are enabled to make almost instantaneous decisions, to obviate

loss of time, no longer to waste it by hesitation, investigation, or vacillation. A trained habit of mind brings all our forces into play instinctively, and the idea of liberty becomes one with that of possession, so that to think of freedom is to be free—in other words to gain the end attained.

So important intellectually is the training of the will that intelligent action is really impossible without it. In our modern day, many intellectual people are victims of hesitation and doubt, incapable of acting in prompt accordance with reason and logic, because their will power has been neglected.

A trained will is a great steadyng power in life. To begin with, it permits us to accomplish each thing in its turn; it saves our opinions from inconsistency, by endowing reason with perspicuity and methodical reflection; it guards us especially from emotional storms, with their injury to one's health and intellectual independence.

Let us not forget, either, that will power accomplishes some very useful deeds and produces some very strong characters.

Timidity, for example, that excessive and uncontrollable agitation which is such a difficulty with many temperaments, comes from nothing but the lack of trained will power. He who does not logically understand the trend of his emotions and control them, cannot argue in a reasonable way.

It must be particularly noted that by training of the will I do not mean the imposition of moral restraints upon it. An individual must feel himself free, cling only to his own ideal of goodness, and repulse all thought of authority, if he is really to be free. He must have no more intention of submitting to undue authority in others than of imposing it himself.

This ideal, inseparable from any conception of life or conduct that is to be of any use to ourselves or others, always develops in

proportion as our will is trained: it constrains us to think methodically, to act with logical conscientiousness.

To cling to an ideal despite all distractions, to shut oneself up with it, to concentrate upon it, to struggle passionately and enthusiastically for the realization of it, to bow to logic—this is what it means to train one's will power and preserve one's mental vigor.

Violence and haste are always the enemies of wisdom and good judgment. What is lost in intensity by stopping to think is more than gained in quality and logic.

If you train your will wisely you will double your life, because by not wasting your days in useless projects you will have realized all of them in the highest aspirations of your mental vision.

And as you will do everything in full possession of your faculties you will not miss the joy of having done what is meritorious and right.

Honesty



Honesty

HONESTY, the quality of conforming to ideas of honor, is a somewhat relative term, varying according to the moral customs of the country. A man generally considers himself honest if he does not overstep the bounds of legalized dishonesty. In commerce, for instance, which is at bottom but a game of deceptions, probity, as Dr. Dubois says, is not everywhere upon the same plane. "There are communities but little civilized in some respects, in which honesty is scrupulously

adhered to; and there are others in which, notwithstanding considerable development along scientific, artistic, and literary lines, the moral conscience seems to have become atrophied. Again some people who are proverbially honest in business have very elastic consciences in regard to sexual morality."

In the liberal professions, or in social positions which place an individual far above the masses, man's honesty consists in adapting his conscience to the exigencies of the moment.

Whether it be a question of commercial or industrial enterprise, of intellectual theories or public or private morals, whether matters of general or of individual interest, masculine honesty is too often a make-shift which, though it may begin with a desire for freedom of action, is apt to end in culpability toward others.

A woman's honesty is something quite different. It consists simply in protecting

“the family honor,” in preventing any “intruder” from crossing the conjugal threshold, in avoiding any scandal of the kind that is calculated to dim the authority of her lord and master, even though it free her soul from its ancient bondage.

That is why a man and a woman can never attain to perfect accord with each other, so much is honesty, taken in its broad sense, a different thing for each. True honesty, the respect for the principle of equity in all things, can have no sex. Regarded either as an absolute or as a relative virtue, it can not be interpreted according to individual temperament.

This primordial difficulty, the cause of continual friction in so called “regular” marriages, has always been too lightly dwelt upon.

How many examples one could give of a lack of moral nicety falsifying the face of honesty and responsibility!

How many really grave offenses are committed by men in power because they know they enjoy immunity from justice! How many things are done that come within the letter of the law but nevertheless trespass on the liberty of others, and display indifference to public opinion and social prejudice!

How many men, sacrificing the most important interests of their country to their personal ambitions, are merely censured by public opinion, escaping all penalties!

The orator and rhetorician mingling his utopias and interested falsehoods in the public press during some moment of national effervescence and excitement, the ringleader crudely deceiving the masses and knowing all the time the despicable nature of his work, the politician betraying his past for present gain and preferment—they are fine ones to talk of honor! Yet to them and many like them a woman must render obedience and respect without comparisons. The

suggestion that her honor and imperious tasks are on a plane above demagogues and scandal mongers is not allowed.

On the other hand, a woman has the privilege of mentioning if she likes that the husband of her best friend is making love to her, destroying in one breath the happiness of some peaceful home, without the necessity of any explanation to the man accused.


The whole difficulty between the sexes can be solved only by placing men and women on an equal footing in point of morals and responsibilities. Only thus can their mutual esteem and value be preserved.

But to reach such a goal they must first study tolerance and the rules of harmony. The man must, in some measure, curb his egoism; the woman must take care that her life is not only given up to love, but to reasonableness as well. There must be social equity, conscience and moral responsibility. Above all, an equal franchise must deter-

mine what is right in business and in private matters, to the end that a moral atmosphere may be created in which forgery and fraud, and lies and currupting of the people, in short all the monstrous paraphernalia of our modern social system, may no longer endure existence. Thus honesty, relative though it be, will become rational, the same for men as for women; and the sexes will again be bound not only by social but by moral contract.



Friendship





Friendship

N the strict sense of the term, friendship, that is to say, affection exempt from all sensuality, plays an enormous rôle in the lives of men and women.

Friendship between men is based on a moral equality. The tie that unites their minds and hearts is formed of the same duties and obligations for both, no matter how far apart may be their fortunes and worldly rank. Wherever there is friendship, there is reciprocity.

It is this fact that makes La Boetie, Montaigne's great friend, say: "Friendship is a sacred word, a sacred thing. . . . There can be no friendship where there is treachery or injustice. . . . The wicked are not friends, they are accomplices."

Emerson, who has sound judgment in regard to everything that is elevated, great, and powerful in the dual character of friendship, has written a wonderful page regarding it, which I should like to quote:

"The sufficient reply to the skeptic who doubts the power and the furniture of man, is in that possibility of joyful intercourse with persons, which makes the faith and practice of all reasonable men. I know nothing which life has to offer so satisfying as the profound good understanding which can subsist, after much exchange of good offices, between two virtuous men, each of whom is sure of himself and sure of his friend. It is

a happiness which postpones all other gratifications, and makes politics, and commerce, and churches, cheap. For when men shall meet as they ought, each a benefactor, a shower of stars, clothed with thoughts, with deeds, with accomplishments, it should be the festival of nature which all things announce. Of such friendship love in the sexes is the first symbol, as all other things are symbols of love. Those relations to the best men, which, at one time, we reckoned the romances of youth, become, in the progress of the character, the most solid enjoyment."

Friendship between women is very different from that between men, just because the sentiment of equality does not play as large a part in it as it should. It is very rare for a woman, no matter how well educated she may be, to forget her rank and fortune in the presence of a friend who is under obligation to her. And it is equally rare for a

woman occupying a modest position not to take offense at everything that makes this inequality evident. The result is that friendship between women is not often a constant interchange of sentiments, and too often may be based on interest rather than on obligation.

Between man and woman friendship may certainly be considered to assume one of its most attractive forms. Between a man and a woman of superior education and refinement, it not only holds a great place in life, but becomes absolutely a necessity, reinforcing the intellectual power of both. Friendship of this sort strongly resembles disinterested love. It is always controlled by mysterious influences, and in that way gains in value. There are certain people who have the gift of inviting our confidences; others who fill our hearts with joy as soon as we see them, dear ones in whose mere presence our spirit becomes brave and our speech more eloquent.

Based on the confidence that the opposite sex inspires in us women, the friendship between man and woman holds something more. Even in family relationships, in what one may call family friendships, it plays an important rôle. It is but rarely that sons betray their mothers, or sisters betray their brothers.

It has been said that friendship is blind; on the contrary, I think it so absolutely conscious of its duty that it needs no oath to consecrate it.

If man considers his friend his second self, a woman considers a man friend her counsellor, confidant and protector all in one. He stands for respect and strength, and unselfish devotion: he becomes the personification of that goodness which furnishes a refuge in time of suffering or wrong doing or need of pardon.

For a man the woman who is his friend is one in whom he could not ask the slightest

change without injury to the purest thing there is in the world: affectionate love that asks for nothing in return.

Too great intimacy always is likely to blight this sort of friendship, which, to quote Emerson again, follows the laws of divine necessity, at any rate, so long as the details of their daily and domestic life are not the same for men and women. Even in this case friendship must keep its aloof and sacred character, or fall into the way of demanding over much.

Yes, the human heart yearns for a friend. It searches for friendship everywhere, from childhood on, and from the moment a friend is gained swells with the pride of having conquered happiness and the desire for better things. In our own eyes we reflect the eyes of a friend, in his absence the mirror reflects his care for us. The sight of him fills us with the greatest emotion, his presence sheds a lustre over each present mo-

ment, and gives us infinite satisfaction. Montaigne has done an injustice to the most beautiful of spiritual things by denying the existence of friendship between men and women, and Nietzsche too readily asserts, not taking moral worth into the account, that friendship between men and women cannot be maintained unless there be some physical antipathy between them.

It seems true that Don Juan and Ninon de Lenclos could never have remained mere friends; but it is also certain that the most beautiful woman can command the greatest respect from an honorable man, even if he is good-looking, for friendship between man and woman rests above all on special conditions and communion of spirit, the sharing of similar tastes, a spirituality full of tenderness, and not on any shadow of desire. The continual interchange of elevating thoughts, the habit of fraternal intercourse, puts a bar to a man and woman friend falling in love, or entertaining any carnal passion.

Individual temperament, of course, plays a large part in these unions of the heart, for friendship may spring from prudence as well as from duly appreciating the sentiments of another. It is evident that two ill-balanced persons cannot make good friends, whereas two dissimilar natures, if on the same moral plane, will be well balanced in friendship, each putting a sort of safety valve upon the other.


For example, a man of calm temperament, whose heart is not dried up, makes the best kind of friend for an impulsive woman, and can have the best possible influence over her.

As for amorous friendships, so copiously discussed, derided and described, I have already said that friendship between man and woman is a form of disinterested love. Amorous friendship on the other hand is love based on mental sympathy, on esteem for another's moral qualities, on admiration

for certain deeds and thoughts that give expression to a temperament. For in amorous friendship, affection which comes from the heart, dominates love which comes from the senses.


This form of friendship is not to be disdained, however dangerous it may appear in the eyes of austere moralists or hypocrites. Consider such a case of friendship between man and woman. If either of them needs advice on matters of deep feeling, it will not be given disinterestedly, direct and without equivocation, unless it be free from jealousy—unless it comes from the heart, and not from the nerves.

Thus it is that amorous friendship is a precious resource, for it alone can inspire the language of deep and protecting love, without ever demanding the recompense of possession.



Divorce







Divorce

MARRIAGE, looked upon by modern society as a necessary mode of union, is also a covenant regulated by law.

In the eyes of Roman Catholics, marriage is a sacrament that cannot be dissolved, and so there is no such thing as divorce.

According to this principle we should have to accept as a sacrament a bond that is more terrestrial and material than spiritual; yet strangely enough, though the Church of Rome enjoins upon man, through the voice of its priests, the attainment of human per-

fection through the *taking of all the sacraments*, she definitely forbids her representatives the priests from partaking of the sacrament of marriage, that one of all others which would be the most helpful to them. In this, the church, it seems to me, makes an illogical exception to her imperious rule.

"Viewed from the point of view of psychology," says Dr. Toulouse, "marriage is an agreement between two human beings based, at first on passion, later on congeniality. From the social standpoint it represents the means taken by nature to reproduce the species.

"The sentiment surrounding the union of two beings has not been too greatly exalted by the poets. It is the highest manifestation of love purifying the sexual instinct.

"Such choice is, in itself, a proof of the free working of the will, which has, for those who hold it within bounds, an influence over the tyrannical impulses of passion. A

woman moreover, giving herself to one man alone, demonstrates the fact that she is her own mistress and can dispose of herself as she likes.

“Sexual liberty, the final outcome of evolution, has nowadays its clearest manifestation in the marriage that is contracted voluntarily by both parties to it. But it follows as a corollary to this that divorce also should be granted at the will of the participants.”

Let us look into the question of divorce from this utilitarian point of view.

Divorce has the advantage of relieving marriage from the stigma of perpetual bondage, from the necessity of being regarded as a grievous yoke, or a prison deliberately entered into to ensure one’s livelihood.

In point of fact it seems only justice not too strictly to enforce the marriage bond in the case of people who find they cannot live together happily, to put an end to moral sorrow, to stop the quarrelsomeness that in

some bad cases goes even so far as violence and murder; to avoid, in a word, all the sentimental and emotional consequences that spring from the principle of the indissolubility of marriage.

To abolish the sad experiment of the marriage of convenience would be equivalent to insuring the perpetuation of the family by children normally begotten and free from morbid tendencies; from the social point of view too, there would be the advantage of acquiring husbands who could not count on the complete shirking of their responsibilities.

How many people live together for long years, strangers to each other in thought and in the flesh! How many people have entered into slavery by reason of abnormal, sterile and mutually hateful marriages! In the name of what principle of religion are women required to live eternally in a Gehenna of tortures as varied as they are

crushing? Is there no individual right to correct miscalculation and despair?

Why should a woman whose husband fails her in the moral support she needs, submit without a struggle to the horrors of a long life of agony, to perpetual combat in which she is miserably crushed; on the other hand, why need a man who does not find his wife the right companion or the slave he desired, have the road to happiness forever barred against him?

Marriage is based on a *contract*. Now, every real contract may be rectified, modified, or canceled. To make a compact, mutual consent is necessary; and from the moment that either party withdraws consent it naturally must dissolve.

Before divorce was established men and women who lived together unhappily had to endure torture worse than death, the unspeakable punishment of being united, body and soul, in hatred, indifference, or contempt.

In earlier times those strong and independent people who had no fear of public opinion or any undue regard for social conventions, went each one his own way, and established a separate home, as is done now in some countries; for example, in Spain, where there is no divorce, where even legal separation is not recognized. But even though they ceased to live together their marriage was still valid, and the question of fortune was a difficult one to handle. It is the same to-day with all marriages between uncongenial couples, whether they lead an infernal life together for propriety's sake, or seek refuge from each other in separation. Under the code of Napoleon a woman cannot dispose of her marriage portion, and the husband, on his side, can sell nothing without the signature of his consort. The joint ownership of property is always a menace to peace, for in married life the individual soul is a sentry always ready to fire on any sign

of trespass. There is, too, not much object in economizing for one's heirs when one's property goes to one's spouse anyway in case of death. A different case, and a very serious one, too, can occur. If the husband or the wife contract debts, then according to law these debts become mutual, so that often the one who has no debts is forced to pay the debts of the other!

How complications multiply, how many doors open to dissension, how much rancor accumulates, through such injustices! Widowhood or widowerhood seems the only way out of desperate situations like these.

And there is something even more serious. In a household completely disunited and exhausted by daily jars, the children are too often present at scenes that must disillusionize them sadly as to "conjugal love." Thus they become victims too, both from the moral point of view as well as that of private interest, to non-divorce; for on account of joint

ownership, that rigid preëmptor, the capital of the children, cannot be increased.

If we pass from this state of things to one which concerns people's private lives the situation is equally grave.

From the day that cohabitation becomes impossible the husband more or less openly sets up in place of his regular marriage an illegitimate union, and it is rather rarely that he does not take into his own house the woman he has chosen for his new companion; this too, despite the fact that the abode of the husband, since his marriage has never been legally broken, remains the conjugal home, and causes additional insult to his rightful spouse.

A woman, on the other hand, though she conducts herself almost always with more tact and consideration than a man, can hardly, unless in cases of separation, prevent echoes of attentions paid her from reaching her husband's ears,

or manage to keep him ignorant of the fact that she gives willingly to another man that favor which she accords him with so much repugnance.

Divorce abolishes the gratuitous insult done to the nuptial rite. The advantages it offers exceed many times the disadvantages enumerated by its defenders. It is a worthless institution to-day because it remains unchanged in spite of the evolution of society all around it.

The opponents of divorce pretend that it destroys family life. That is not true, because there are no longer any families to destroy. Frankly and fairly, what has become of the old-time family? The rule of the majority has made mere children independent; compulsory education, though it has not greatly changed the condition of the masses, has taken the edge off parental responsibility; and in the vast world of higher education, what with college

life and education by the State, boys and girls soon become strangers to those that have given them birth.

If hypocrisy were not at the root of prejudice, we could soon persuade ourselves that nothing remains of the family considered as a sacred institution.

Authority on one side, and submission on the other, are exceptional conditions; and the sacrifices that parents used to make of every kind, even that of their own happiness, are scarcely called for in our day.

No, divorce is useful, necessary, right. But it can and must become more so by development and modification. Divorce by mutual consent should be the remedy for ills that disgrace the human soul; those unfortunately married should be allowed to dissolve their union without having to expose to public curiosity or judges or malicious lawyers all the intimate details of two lives wrecked by misunderstandings and incom-

patibility, excess, ill-treatment and outrage. And those who escape from their conjugal jail should be permitted, profiting by the experience they have gained, to wed the beloved one that has consoled and sustained them in the battle of life.

Nine times out of ten these new marriages are happy, because the contracting parties have had time to appreciate each other's good qualities, because they have obeyed the law of love, because they have not followed conventions, and generally speaking, are not guided by self-interest, that chief and most pernicious cause of disagreement between the sexes.

Divorce as it stands to-day in Catholic countries, does not offer a complete solution of the distressing problems of married life. It is inadmissible, inhuman, worse, immoral, that a human being who has suffered patiently during twenty years for "the sake of the children," should, if he finally desert that

hell, be condemned to pass the remainder of his days in concubinage. It is not right that he should not be allowed to light his love at a new hearth, or consecrate by marriage the affection and devotion that have healed his old wounds, given him new joy of life, new moral and social obligations.

The day divorce laws become just, and not, as is too often the case now, a tacit connivance at libertinism; the day a divorce can be obtained whenever the party able to give substantial reason for it desires it, or can be gained by mutual consent; when certain unions of the sexes besides legitimate marriage are recognized by law as responsible, when the adulterer is no longer infamous, and both lover and mistress, under normal circumstances, can wed—then many incoherent situations will be equitably solved, and we shall have worked intelligently for the individual and for society.

The Family





The Family

TO-DAY the institution of the modern family, specially in Northern countries has become an almost artificial thing. Probably in the near future it will be completely disintegrated.

In France, especially among the middle classes, the family seems to me destined to remain for a long time what it was in ancestral days, because it forms an association whose members, closely bound together, preserve mutual commercial or industrial interests. This sort of family type of the frugal classes will subsist as long as its

members maintain their associations, and keep intact its ancient social traditions, each continuing his special interest in the family enterprises. In Spain, where the Moorish conquest has left still so many traces of primitive organization, the family bears to this day certain traits of slavery, though one may actually hear Spanish women boast of it.

We must not consider here only these two special types, in which the different members of the family yield to the man as head and master; for the family has had different phases according to environment, national custom and social stations.

In order to reach less specialized conclusions, we must begin at the beginning, and consider the family as it has evolved with the progress of civilization. The first mention of the family in the history of the human race is of a patriarchial group consisting of father, mother and children. Marriage was

not then necessary; instead there were various successive unions. The sexes mingled promiscuously, so that women belonged to various men, and children had no particular father. Conditions such as these prevailed in many instances for so long that the Christian Church was obliged for a time to tolerate this kind of sexual communism. Herodotus tells us that Lycian children bore the name of their mother; Varron assures us that the same custom prevailed in Athens, and that a woman, if she was the producer of the family wealth, alone inherited it.

When polygamy came in, woman was reduced to a state of seclusion amounting sometimes even to slavery. Her principal rôle consisted in bringing children into the world, children whom she was left more often than not to bring up by instinct rather than intelligence or affection.

As for man, he sought chiefly his physical gratification in his associations with women,

and concerned himself very little about paternity.

Later, partly owing to increasing civilization, association with one wife set limits to the family, and separate groups and classes of such families were formed, which, little by little drifted together, though not necessarily with any blood relationship between them, and the status of the family was still further modified.

Causes for its gradual dissolution have increased in accordance with environment, and social status. In one place the law of primogeniture conferred special privileges; in another paternal control lessened the authority of the mother over her daughters. In general there has been a tendency toward emancipation of the individual—till finally, in our time, in either extreme of society, the institution of the family is, as I say, something almost artificial. Peace no longer exists in intimate family relations; either

there is trouble between the husband and the wife, or a proper balance is not maintained between parents and children, or between brothers and sisters; there is a clash of opinions, intolerance, a jarring of personal interests, and rarely harmony.


Furthermore, I must say that I think the reasons for marriage are not the same now as they used to be, when unions were indissoluble, founded on the instinct of proprietorship and the rule of a group.


The love match itself, though it is the only respectable union after all, has broken down the original intention of marriage, because with it has come the legal aspect of the situation, so that even though love does not endure, the law which joined the lovers still has its responsibilities. The law will no longer tolerate the brutal lord and master, or permit a woman to be degraded when she is the more virtuous and morally steady party to the contract. It has been said that it is

enough for a woman to be beautiful, and a mother. That is a piece of honeyed foolishness. A woman has the right to the development of all her faculties, the exercise of all her functions besides the machinery of maternity. Many noble feminine natures have proved that besides conceiving children they have been qualified to follow in the immortal footsteps of heroes, artists and thinkers. Every day we see women compete in talent, energy and patient application with scientists, poets and intellectual speculators on spiritual things.

But it will be said that such pretensions are contrary to the idea of the family. There is nothing in that. The family, essentially modified, allows to each member his own opinions, and provided reciprocal rights and duties are observed, it needs no further adornment than children born not from questionable contracts, or dubious connections based on interest, but of sincere love.

*The Complete Independence
of Woman*







The Complete Independence of Woman

TO the question succinctly stated: "Why should man assume the right to live as he pleases, and woman submit to a prohibitive mode of morals?" men reply that legitimate union requires first of all that adultery and the introduction of bastards into the family must be avoided.

This retort takes account of only one special point: it answers in the case of married women only. In the case of women that are free, by what right shall we say they must not experience complete independence



—enjoyment just like men? "The life of woman as well as that of man," Miramont has said, "is a harmonious evolution, which passes through every phase, and extracts the essence from all successive forms and aspects of existence. Daughter, mother, and grandmother; imaginative, courageous or meditative, woman, like man, is transformed many times in the course of her existence, and shows progress constantly."

The very fact of social evolution, the combination of various forces in the combat of life, the rationalization of education, should long ago have shown that woman is not an inferior being fit only to propagate the species.

Happily we are now far removed from the theories of a Schopenhauer, with his idea of woman as afflicted with intellectual myopia, a puerile, futile and limited thing, inferior to man in her sense of equity and justice, and in honesty; lacking common

sense and reflection; incapable of taking part disinterestedly in anything whatsoever, etc., etc.

If the chief peculiarity of woman is that nature destined her to be a mother, it is no less true, in spite of her more delicate organization and her sensitiveness to impressions, that her mind quickly grasps details and her brain substantially is as capable as that of a man.

The apparent inferiority of woman comes from her being oppressed by laws, and misused by the moralists; her natural fearfulness and diffidence are imaginary rather than real.

The truth is that man, desiring to preserve the supremacy which he feels to be his due, does not enjoy in woman the qualities of courage and independence. He will not admit that any encounter may have fatalities between two beings impelled by the same needs and the same desires. Men like to see

women tied down by the material household needs, and thoughtful women who can no longer resign themselves to this, want their sex to be emancipated by equal rights.

The partisans of unrestricted feminism recognize no difference between man and woman, but assert that there is a biological equality on which their claim to social equality is based.

Without going quite so far as that at present, one may yet believe that women should enjoy more and more independence, and be allowed without too much shocking of the moralists to prove their courage and their faculties.

Unfortunately, the case is true, as one moralist has put it: "Kept apart from the magnificent realities of life, so beautiful even in their often brutal ugliness, forever held in a state of moral dependence more injurious than physical bondage, only quitting the maternal yoke to come under conjugal

tutelage, brought up with no thought but that of a marriage that is to transform the child suddenly and brusquely into a wife, the wife into a mother, educated according to the prejudices of the "set" in which she moves and prevented thus from developing any personality, sacrificed in advance, women do not develop normally unless they happen to find the perfect being who conforms to the elaborate ideal they have set up in their obscure minds. And as social conventions do not permit them to seek this ideal, which is vague and distorted enough by novels and other reading, as fate generally enlightens them too late to change the order of the existence which they have accepted through timidity or ignorance or despite—so, thoroughly under the control of society, they mostly remain children submissive to their lot; or they rebel and seek visionary compensations: in any case they are 'not understood.' "



The case cannot be put better than that. For many centuries man has denied the existence in women of the highest qualities, bravery and presence of mind, so that most women have come to the conclusion that these qualities are not feminine at all, are even defects if they happen to occur in the feminine nature.

Now, if tenderness be the most beautiful attribute of woman, one must recognize that true tenderness is a characteristic particularly of women that are strong and courageous and masters of finesse. The acceptance of servitude does not comport with true tenderness, the kind, for example, that leads to the conception and execution of works of art, the kind that inspires noble deeds, the kind that exerts a wonderful influence in every degree of the social scale.

In many countries, the attention of thinkers has been, for several years, riveted on the *liberty of woman*. In many cases there has

been equivocation and reaction; in opposition to a Stuart Mill many philosophers like Nietzsche have risen up. The idea has made steady progress nevertheless in scientific minds, and the rational social point of view has made people study seriously the ultimate liberation of woman from her social yoke.

In far off days, in many races, the males were chosen by the females for their prowess, their physical strength, their native beauty. As selection led to a progressive evolution of the male in such races, there resulted also though evidently in an obscure and unconscious way, an ideal female type as complement to it.

But when woman became the "property" of man, a slave destined to work for the male, the development of the race was completely arrested. The salutary act of selection exercised by the woman, stopped when she was not free to choose.

In a new state of society, woman, while

satisfying her mental ambitions, will regain complete liberty; the law of affinities will prevail and under the force of the feminine ideal, more vigorous and hardy races will prepare to meet the future.



The War Upon Feminism





The War Upon Feminism

 T is almost incredible that so many men capable of reasoning intelligently and with logic, should have set themselves against modern feminism. I say "modern" in order to specify the exact status of the conflict, for as Lucien Muhlfelt has expressed it, "eternal feminism" is contemporaneous with "the eternal feminine." After Schopenhauer's and Strindberg's attempts to demonstrate the inferiority of woman, the present efforts of the detractors of feminism have proved very feeble. Since woman is in their eyes an in-

ferior being they are battling with something of which theoretically they should have no fear—and that in itself shows lack of courage; on the other hand if they admit that in our modern state of society, woman's rôle is a more and more important one, they recognize her competition with them—with sufficient insincerity, it would seem.

The moment woman realizes that she can earn a living in employments hitherto reserved for men, she demands perforce her share in instruction and in education, and mental inequality will ultimately cease to exist.

At first, unable to rise above the subordinate family position assigned to her by the civil code, she dreamed of setting her spirit free at any rate, of cultivating at least her intellectual powers. Yet the premises of science have sought to deny her even that.

Now from remotest times woman has worked as hard as man and often harder, a

fact which should win recognition for her physical strength. When man in the savage state hunted and battled to appease his hunger, woman often hunted and fought with him as his companion, carrying the slain beast on her shoulders; or she stayed at home and spun all the linen for the family's clothes. Even her state of bondage required intelligence and devotion; and when, later, the family was established on a lawful basis, she had to perfect her talents more and more.

Long ages passed. In time, man no longer had to battle daily for subsistence. A succession of inventions gradually modified his way of life. He began to found liberal professions, he informed himself, and developed his power and his authority, all the time that woman continued bound down by her duties as wife and mother. A time came when woman learned special employments and made them her own; but man took these up too—the needle, and the making of

clothes, cooking and hair-dressing and the rest. That is why, ever since the XVIIIth century, women have tried to make themselves felt in letters and in art. That is why, and the Revolution helped in this, woman has dreamed of claiming equal rights with men. To-day, as the result of schools and education, women realize that they can exert their faculties to better advantage than ever before. They have outgrown the time when man absorbed all occupations and there was nothing for a woman to do but get married, if possible, before the bloom of her youth was lost to her.

Sad indeed, was woman's fate when she had no legal escape from bondage but to marry for money or submit herself to prostitution.

Whatever certain philosophers and anti-suffragettes may say, if the physique of woman has grown weaker with the ages, it has been due solely to the fact that her

vigor has been permitted to go to waste, and her moral personality along with it.

In spite of all this, throughout the progress of science, with its innovations of all kinds, its economic and social changes in daily life; throughout the growing complexity of new modes of existence, woman nevertheless began to make her influence felt, became conscious of it, and fortified it by study, by increased method and experience.

Strindberg, the woman-hater, when he declared woman "incapable of acquiring complete knowledge on any subject whatsoever," said something very foolish. The contrary is shown by the fact that in college, in art or at the bar, women frequently prove themselves, if not superior to men, at least their equals.

It must be remembered that for hundreds of years, even in highly civilized countries, women have been kept below men in the matter of education. Considering how far

behind her rival she started in the race, what she has accomplished since gives the lie to those who declare she is not man's equal. It refutes those who will not believe that equality, from being originally a law of nature, has become a principle of existence in our modern society.

If it be true that several generations must pass before a high standard of physical perfection is attained, the same is true of moral and intellectual qualities. Woman, if only because she is now conscious of her *ego*, is destined henceforth to fill a more important place in the life of nations.

No longer a kind of social parasite, woman intends henceforth to regulate her life for herself. If she no longer wears the breastplate as in the days of the Teutons, or the helmet and sword, so as to fight by man's side, none the less she is making herself his equal on an intellectual footing. Man may continue to advance in science and in art,

but that is no reason why he should take advantage of the alleged inferiority of woman.

In short, woman to-day, by aspiring to range with man in fields of knowledge that he has hitherto arrogated to himself, by evincing a desire to try her judgment and prove her taste and skill, is only vindicating her rights.

“While in man,” says Louis Dimier, “taste, which is a spiritual quality, precedes and controls skill, the mastery of one’s means; in woman, on the contrary, it seems to be skill that precedes and leads to taste. It can literally be said that a woman has a feeling for the beautiful at her fingertips. Besides, almost all women infallibly and necessarily give full rein to their capacity for doing things, while a man may all his life content himself with the exercise of his critical faculties.”


Indisputably, woman is fundamentally man’s equal. Stunted and checked till re-

cently by special customs that made her something of no account, she aspires now, thanks to the diffusion of instruction, the confusion of classes, the change in social conditions, to become a respected artisan, a doer of things worth while. Born to a new life, she will no longer be the jealous adversary of man, but rather his valued coadjutor, and none the less his courageous sharer of joys and sorrows.



*The Equalization of
Classes Through Education*







The Equalization of Classes Through Education

HEDUCATION, which consists in the progressive adaptation of humanity to the conditions of social life, has been so generally and strongly developed in our modern civilization that, if it has not created absolute equality among the classes, it has at least drawn the aristocracy, the middle classes, and the people nearer together in a common effort toward individual expression.

There is observable everywhere, and undeniably, a very effective phase of this growing equality, arising from a multiplicity of causes, among which may be specially men-

tioned the cutting up of large fortunes, the growing importance of the labor unions, and the competition which has been introduced into all trades and liberal professions.

There is scarcely anything left of the ancient status of the nations: the abolition of slavery has transformed the old theory of servitude; compulsory instruction has raised the level of the lower classes; the first stone of the new social edifice has been laid. But humanity, in gaining a higher conscience, a new ideal, has made for itself a new heart, created needs for which the old instincts are insufficient. Capitalists, manufacturers, merchants, the poor, workmen of all kinds, face each other now, alive to their rights, if not always to their duties, inspired by new necessities, mingling in a common life at the same time that they strive among themselves industrially.

The populace, whose whole effort used to be put forth in the struggle for existence, is

trying to emancipate itself; the social flood has risen, swamping those special classes that had hitherto monopolized stock-jobbing and money-making; the labor unions, in their war with capital, are playing the part of capitalists themselves; the working class, thanks to better and better education, has thrust some of its members forward into higher positions; the middle classes devote themselves to capturing public offices; and by an inevitable reaction the aristocracy, whose ancestral rights and prerogatives, as well as their fortunes, have been curtailed, turn to trade and commerce.

This does not mean that a perfect equilibrium has been established, for I am of the opinion of Jean Lahor: "Plutocracy is, perhaps, preparing for the future a dominion even more crushing, more corrupt, and more incapable—through the influence of the press, which it will hold completely in its power—than that of any of the old aristocracy."

cies or autocracies, which at least originated in splendid human force or noble ambition for power."

But since ignorance no longer directs men's relations with one another an average of equality in action has been established in modern society, and must be reckoned with. If the lower classes have climbed the ladder into regions formerly preëmpted by the upper classes, these, on the other hand, have not hesitated to descend from the heights to which the prejudices of their rank confined them, and invade the professions and business in their search for occupation.

A grandee does not consider himself degraded if he becomes the head of an automobile factory; a noble may interest himself in commercial pursuits; a prince of royal blood is willing to have the produce of his vineyards or his fields sold under his own name.

With woman it is the same. Thinking more, drawn on by the need of making her-

self more useful to society, yielding more now than formerly to the necessity of individual effort, the woman of the middle classes fits herself sometimes even for the requirements of science. Great ladies and princesses are no longer ashamed to earn money in the industrial arts, in painting or in literature.

And the new social conditions will prevail in proportion as education becomes more perfect and man more deeply conscious of a sense of justice as Herbert Spencer construes it—that is to say, a sense of personal responsibility at one with the spirit of social coöperation.

Complete equality between the sexes will never exist, of course:—only a relative equality, based on mutually liberal ideas that hurt neither one sex nor the other.

It must not be forgotten that social peace springs from the balancing of various rights and duties, and that the division must be

equitably arranged. One must take into consideration the fact that the humblest workman, like the most famous engineer, the greatest inventor, the loftiest writer or the most noted statesman, works for the ultimate good of society; that each is the equal of the other in moral duties as in moral rights.

Education, that leveller of castes and dispenser of justice and peaceful bounty, must grow out of a fund of individual experiences contributing all of them to the experience of the social whole. It must come to each of us as much through himself as through others, and reach us all moreover by the road of reason.

“It is by the synthesis of all methods of education and hygiene,” says the author of *Heroic Pessimism*, “by the synthetic efforts of all educators and hygienists, that profound reforms and great physical, intellectual and moral progress in the conduct of human life, will be brought about.”

Socialism

536596



Socialism

S distinguished from individualism, socialism has in mind the idea of a time when everything that pertains to force—capital, property, work, etc.—shall have undergone a kind of process of socialization. In general, the term signifies a kind of social covenant between the various members of society.

Originating in the XVIIIth century, socialism pure and simple, intended primarily to remould the various classes of society into one social entity, is now divided into various different camps, carrying on a hostility with each other that reminds one of the jarring members of a royal family. We have the

socialism of the followers of Blanc, somewhat worn out now, but still retaining its partisans; opportunist socialism, Marxian socialism, agrarian socialism, parliamentary socialism, English municipal socialism, collectivist socialism, state socialism, Christian socialism, the socialism of the pulpit—and who knows what else.

This difference over the first principle of socialism, the regulation of society, shows how difficult it is to piece together any new social mechanism that will satisfy everyone.

In my opinion the difficulty is, first of all, to hit upon some means of association by which the person and the possessions of each associated member will be defended and protected with united strength, in which, certain stipulated obligations excepted, each member, in unison with all the others, will nevertheless owe obedience to himself alone and retain full liberty of action.

It should come to pass that no one would

be rich enough to buy anyone else and reduce him to servitude, and no one poor enough to be obliged to sell himself.

It should not be possible for any man to say: I am hungry and I do not know how I am to get food; I am cold and I do not know where I can get warm; I have no shelter and I do not know where to lay my head. And no woman should have to resort to prostitution to escape destitution.

Man, no longer obliged to hire out his physical strength or his intellect, and woman, no longer obliged to traffic in her sex, would enjoy security in their lives, and a kind of equality would be established among them.

But this equality—is it not a chimera? Can it exist in practice? Are not abuses inevitable? How can everybody's thoughts and duties be so regulated as to delimit the wealth and power of the great, or the avarice and covetousness of the lowly?

The problem of socialism is to force upon society an economical equality that will satisfy each individual in it; in which he who has climbed up one or two rungs of the social ladder need not envy those who are already at the top. Everything that engenders discontent or envy or desire for vengeance between the classes, forced into constant relations with each other as they are, must be done away with. Much mischief would be avoided in that way. But it would still be necessary to turn aside opposing currents, to base socialism on "a simplification of life," holding to intellectualism all the time as its definite goal.

"The characteristic quality of the social organism," says Nicati, "is that it exists as an intellectual force: a trusted intermediary between individuals, whence all activity originally emanates and upon whom all activity ultimately and indubitably returns, just as the emotional mind intervenes

between incoming thoughts or impressions and outgoing emotions, or expressions.

“The functioning of this natural organism conforms to the religious principles that determine its formation and its deeds.

“The final object of this organism is to guide men to harmony, just as intelligence guides the emotions to harmony, and to unite them in a general effort toward equilibrium.

“The doctrine of intellectualism can, then, be defined as a natural social organization the object of which is the religious pursuit of good,—remembering that by ‘religious’ we mean that which conforms to the natural mechanism of social relations; and by ‘good’ the necessary and natural aim of complete harmony, equilibrium.”

And yet, it seems to me in point of fact, that social equilibrium is no better established now than it was before. The scales that overbalanced on one side, now overbal-

ance on the other. The inconveniences of instability remain.

Why, then, should the wealthy classes be expected to strip themselves completely only that another class may step into their shoes? Is not absolutely the same result attained whether the inequality be at the top or at the bottom, whether it is attained by a downward or an upward movement? Is not the despotism of the multitude as dangerous as that of the favored few?

It may be true that every man has a natural right to what he needs, but it is true no less that his "right" is limited by his necessities.

Theories to the contrary notwithstanding the social organization of humanity is not yet perfected, and will not be, as long as Society fails to realize that the chief end and aim of its existence is the satisfaction of each individual's needs in turn.

The Working Classes





The Working Classes

SHE rôle which the working man plays in modern society is one of the utmost importance. Producers of national wealth, they are part of an arterial system by means of which the national blood and heart exert their functions. Jean Lahor has said: "The wealth and power and glory of a country are in great part the product of the humblest of her children, artisans, laborers, obscure soldiers, unknown heroes of whom no one speaks, who are as mute in life as they must be at last in the silences of death."

And John Lubbock has said on his part: "It is an interesting example of human

solidarity, and an encouragement for those who can not pretend to any genius, to think that on the whole, and with scarcely any exceptions, the periods of greatest progress have usually been those in which the people of a nation have been united in a common belief and purpose. Progress, in other words, has been due not so much to the exertions of superior minds as to the common effort of thousands of ordinary men, not to the genius of one man alone, but to the labor of all the people."

If, then, the workman is a great factor in national power, it is only right that he should engross the attention of thinkers in social problems. One fact demands recognition: that the education of the modern workman is not yet consonant with the place he fills in the state.

I dream of schools for the children of the working classes, schools planned especially for them, in which the place the child is to

play in his future work is made a kind of religion, where the employer of the future shall figure as a kind of beneficent protector. The child who is to become the workman of the future must understand from his earliest years that he is not merely a passive instrument, but a most active element of society. Pride in his employment must be inculcated in him, not bitterness and hatred, or envy of those higher classes that are as socially vital an element in their way as he is in his. The working classes—though this is something that socialism and evolutionism have not yet understood the need of—very properly form a special major class in a nation, not to be excluded from the exercise of their rights, but rather, because they are the hardest working and least happy class of all, to insure advantages for them.

The nations of the earth ought to realize more keenly than they do that their main source of strength is the laboring man; they

ought to unite in making him the object of constant administrative solicitude, with rewards according to his deserts and help as his need demands it.

The health of a nation on the whole depends so much on that of its working population, that I believe the day will come when sanitary dwellings, public baths, cheap lavatories, public parks as in America, and working men's clubs, with the advantages of mental and moral training gained through them, will be regarded as national necessities.

It is very strange that democratic countries so often neglect the most urgent reforms, so often prove themselves more slow than aristocracies like England to agitate improvements for that humble class which is yet in point of numbers and of industry the strongest of them all.

Compare, for instance, the hospitals of France with those of England, of Germany, or even those of Russia; we can readily

see which has the advantage of the comparison.

The idea of houses specially built for working men originated in France, they tell us. I admit that, but they were not actually built in France till after England and Belgium had shown the way. Where in France can one find those "garden cities" that England and America rejoice in? It is not only in the matter of food supply that the French laboring man need envy the lot of his English neighbor. Germany and Belgium, too, have had their laborers' retreats for some time.

The working man tied down by his unremitting toil, kept too much away from people of higher education and mentality, needs the chance to get away from himself if he is to derive any personal benefit from it all, or develop a proper taste for family life.

When legislators, rulers, educators and employers see to it at last that a value and

respect consonant with his social value are rendered to the working man, that day a thousand spontaneous and ingenious reforms will spring into life.

It seems clear to me that in working men's communities, each dwelling may become a temple of fraternity. I cite an example of the sort of thing that might be done. A workman marries; he and his consort live in a little house that becomes inadequate after the birth of their children, and so not hygienically practicable. Near him is another workman whose house, now that his children have grown up and gone their way, is too large for him. Disengaged of his family he exchanges houses with the man whose family is still growing:—a fraternal exchange according to individual exigencies, with relative happiness for everybody, and hygienic conditions for all.

Utopia! I hear some one exclaim. Why? In reality nothing can be simpler. But unhappily, simplicity is the foe of reason.

Servants





Servants

SINCE the abolition of slavery domestic service has assumed continually new and more oppressive forms, until now as an institution it threatens to disappear completely. The words Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, which some do not understand at all and others misinterpret, are responsible for great unrest in society. The domestic of the past, a man or woman working for wages yet forming an integral part of the family, no longer exists. As ideas of loyalty gave way to false conceptions of liberty, servants steadily

altered their code of manners, and have now become intolerable. To-day, for people of moderate means, the dearth of servants presents a serious problem, although fortunately the increasing tendency toward specialization assures us the service, for the least household need, of women who go out to work by the day.

We take an active interest in houses for workmen, we have in all good faith sought to realize the vision of a better future for those in humble walks of life; why, then, do we not concern ourselves with the flats and apartment houses in which promiscuous living has become one of the principal impediments to that "good and faithful service" so greatly prized by our forefathers?

In our day, servants looking upon themselves as a particular kind of "employee," are exacting, intractable, and highly specialized in their domestic functions. Except in palaces and large private houses where

the staff is continually renewed and wages are high, good service is no longer met with.

In such establishments they form a legion apart, in which each is occupied with his own affairs and not in direct touch every minute of the day with the master or mistress. Under such circumstances the trying relation of man and master, of master and man, is well-nigh avoided.

The most serious problem of all is that of small households in the flat houses of large cities, in which, to save space, masters and servants are herded together in small apartments abounding in glass doors and thin partitions. Now, to have the master respected in his private life and secure willing obedience from a servant, there must be a material distance between them, proportionate to their moral and intellectual separation.

“No one is a hero to his valet,” says the proverb. It is unfortunately a true one, and emphasizes an evil which has grown until it

has become impossible for apartment house dwellers to have good servants at all.

In America there is a practice by which this question is in a fair way to be solved. In England the example set by the United States is now being followed; the Continent, in its turn, should follow a practical measure that ensures independence for both employer and employed—namely, the plan of “service” by the hour; an arrangement which, though it does not mean that domestic service in its present form will disappear completely, promises to avert the menace of finding ourselves without any service at all.

Like all innovations, this suggestion will immediately frighten some people, and make others smile; it will seem paradoxical, notwithstanding its simplicity. I want, however, to explain my idea of it.

It is an established fact that we have become slaves to our servants, who impose

lordly conditions on us when they enter our service, compelling us to accede to their unreasonable demands under pain of ostracism by the whole servant class. In America—I cite typical examples—things have come to such a pass that the family cannot have meals at home on Sundays, because the “chef” or cook, spends his Sundays in the country; in England, chambermaids refuse to wait up in the evening for the return of their mistresses. (I know a lady, with neither children nor husband, who had to go to bed with her clothes on, because her maid, barricaded in her own room, would not get up to unfasten her corsage!) In Germany servants exact a promise from their employers to be allowed certain evenings on which to attend masked balls; here, in France, the weekly, or bi-weekly outing is one of the least of the inconveniences to which the servant class subjects us.

Yet if people living in apartment houses

can call a nurse in case of emergency, and employ a watchman to prevent robbery, why cannot the most essential things be sent out for too?

“Service by the Hour” would have this advantage, that it would furnish regular attendance, and also, by specializing, give servants better wages: they would not be under the necessity of obeying the commands of any one master, or one mistress all day long; but could choose whom to serve, just as a master chooses his employees. Both sides would have more liberty. On the one hand work conscientiously performed, on the other perfect peace of mind, less bitterness in mutual relations, more equity for everyone, would result. Promiscuous association of mistress and maid would be abolished, there would be no more slovenly, reluctant cleaning, no more fear of impertinence, no temper shown over work badly done, or not done at all.

If you can have in a *masseur* or a *masseuse* or even someone to give you a bath, a hairdresser, a manicure, a pedicure, a woman to pack up your things, a vacuum cleaner, a man to polish your floors—what is there left for your servants to do? If a woman comes for your dresses and takes them to be pressed and refurbished, and a valet does the same for your husband's suits, while a bootblack cares for the shoes, are not the most important things attended to?

Companies for "Service by the Hour" could be formed in various parts of cities, so that we could, at our own pleasure, telephone to one of them when we wanted a bath, or to be dressed, or to have our hair arranged, or our housework done, and so on.

What a pleasure to feel free in our own homes, to know that we were no longer spied upon, that we were our own masters. . . . with no flunkies!

But the expense, someone says! On the contrary, if you calculate how much the servants quartered in your house cost you, not to mention the little things they may add to many of your bills, you will come to the conclusion that "service by the hour," besides the advantage to the servants of gaining them better pay for less working time, means a reduction of the master's expenses all around.

Already there are modern apartment houses in which one kitchen serves for all the tenants. You appoint the hours for meals, state the number of your guests, and they are served regularly at the appointed time.

The postman comes up to your apartment in the elevator, unless a lock-box be reserved for each tenant, etc., etc.

"Service by the Hour" would do away with a thousand inconveniences, some of them annoying through their constant repetition, others quite serious, as for example,


in England, where the testimony of servants is of so much effect in divorce cases.

With “Service by the Hour” there would be an end to spying, to petty revenge, to disgraceful compromises. The lower classes have shaken off the yoke of their servitude, then why should we remain victims to the new domestic conditions ourselves?

No real happiness can be had without independence; let us each, therefore, strive for individual liberty.

In benefiting ourselves in this way, humanitarian ends would in no way be subverted, for after all, the best interests of a community are served by guarding the liberty of each individual, whatever his class.





International Schools





International Schools

NOW that the nations of the world fraternize in science, commerce, and industry, now that they are more or less in economic partnership, and collective labor without regard to nationality has become the means of material and moral progress for every individual, the founding of international schools in the different civilized countries is essential. Nurseries of the intelligence and the will, such institutions would bring pupils together under one system of rational instruction and expose

them to the same tests. Thus there would be an interchange of individuality among the nations, and race hatred would give place to a regard for common rights and the moral conduct of society.

Armed peace, costly though it be for every nation, is a boon to modern times. By preserving the integrity of its territory, each country is more at liberty to join with its neighbor in that higher conception of evolution that urges the nations on toward economic partnership.

Formerly, if we may take France as an example, the provinces, divided by their own particular and immediate interests, detested one another. They were separated by the barriers of antagonistic temperaments and different customs; although they spoke the same language each remained a stranger to the other. As successive agreements drew them closer together, each country attained to a certain unity of thought,



and then the idea of a rigid frontier between nation and nation grew gradually weaker, until to-day a united humanity looks toward an education of the individual upon a basis of internationalism. We hope that future generations, freed from excessive patriotism, will attain to what I may call a geographic fraternity, and in the achievement of this purpose, nothing would be so valuable as the founding of international schools in which the varying currents of ideas should solve the great problem of comparative education.

Let us imagine such schools in every country. Young men and girls, sent abroad but still required to follow the course of study prevailing in their own land, would find their education supplemented by intellectual intercourse with boys and girls in the foreign school. Their horizons would be enlarged; they would become cosmopolitans without effort, reaping the advantages

of an environment favorable to the development of their personality; and they would return at last to their homes, equipped with self-reliance and clear understanding. Moreover, they would have that knowledge of foreign tongues so essential to the advancement of commerce, industry, literature and the arts.

The young man or girl brought up in this way, with a proper sense of international relationships, would be impelled to special effort each in his or her proper field. Infallibly it would result that they would be good servants of their country at an age when ordinarily they would be dreaming of globe-trotting, wanting to get away from themselves but without ability to profit by that interchange of ideas and customs which the international school, at an age when, by a natural law, assimilation is mere play, would guarantee them.

If we consider how many expensive jour-

neys made by professional or business men of sedentary lives after their education has been completed, prove well-nigh useless, we shall appreciate the advantages which would accrue from the interchange among the nations of pupils who are young, tractable and capable of acquiring more quickly and thoroughly the elements of a complete education.

It goes without saying that each of our parties that is sent abroad should be headed by professors of its own language and nation, to continue the studies prescribed in the curriculum of the fatherland. Living in the midst of strangers, outside of the classes, these colonists, without effort would acquire another language, would be introduced to new manners and new ideas, and enrich their minds by a thousand bits of knowledge of use in the maturing of their own thought. In this way each, without losing touch with his own country, would

benefit by the constant presentation of subjects for comparison and analysis.


Saint-Beuve conceived of something of this sort when he said on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870: "They are preparing for war between the two greatest nations of Europe. . . . They would do better to found two schools, one in Berlin, the other in Paris. The best of our young scientists should strengthen themselves in the laboratories of Berlin, which are better equipped than ours; the Prussians should seek refinement from our French breeding. . . . " In fact, in any branch of human activity, the difficulty between countries is to understand each other. Whether it is medicine or industry, commerce or education, how much good work along the same lines is never heard of in other countries, and how much is progress retarded, owing to this national exclusiveness! With international schools, the mutual solution of

problems would be possible, because in addition to the sharing of education there would be an interchange of instruction.


In commerce and industry, especially, international transactions would not only be on a larger scale but could be more conveniently carried on.

Through uniformity of customs and community of ideas and sentiments in the field of common welfare, international law could not fail to insure peace, and at the same time encourage friendly rivalry and emulation, on which all progress depends. Autocracy, democracy, imperialism, all would be merged in the one desire for a better future.

The day that equality of effort among nations becomes the rule, the wealth of the world will increase tenfold, merely by the labor of minds which have become cosmopolitan.



*The Necessity of Religion
and its Influence upon
the People*





The Necessity of Religion and its Influence upon the People

RELIGION is neither an aggregation of national laws nor a body of philosophical dogma. It is of far higher worth than it appears in the representations of current doctrine. “To throw a sudden light on a man and catch him by surprise in his religion—that is the way to discern the code of moral judgments and experiences that govern his daily life. In the same way, applied to society, religion is signified in those deeds that are emblematic of the relations between individuals; or, to

put it in more ordinary phrase, it constitutes the *principles of social harmony*."

In giving us this definition Dr. Nicati had no particular religion in mind, but the general sum of all religions that make for some code of morality.

The religious idea, though the rulers of France now consider it to have outlived its usefulness, is nevertheless of undeniable importance, because the untutored, and all people whose brains are not nourished with knowledge, need some ideal guidance and restraint. And what a powerful restraint it is, this fear of eternal punishment, what an incentive the hope of an everlasting reward!

All the rhetoricians may talk as they like, materialists may argue as they please: the fact remains that our greatest men, in line with the Littrés, the Taines, the Renans and many others, all declare the people must have a religion, if only as a system of morals.

I shall not attempt to discuss the evolu-

tion of religions, much less that of Rome, which from the nature of its origin still constitutes the moral strength of the Latin peoples. It seems to be a fact just the same that in France, in spite of compulsory secular education, crime has increased alarmingly, whereas in England, as that fine thinker Sir John Lubbock has lately called to our attention, they have had to close some of their prisons for lack of prisoners.

Be not deceived—crime in France is in direct ratio to the lowering of the moral standards; the comparative absence of crime in England is due to the respect shown there for every religious sect, provided only that it inculcates religious sentiments in the young, that is to say, fear of punishment for wrongdoing, and some hope of reward for virtue.

No matter how greatly education, generation after generation, may develop the moral intelligence, religion, which after all

is the disciplining of the passions, must necessarily endure.

“We have,” says the author of *Self Education*, “enough schools of the kind that provide general information, and furnish technical knowledge in all branches; what we need are schools to mould men.” The Catholic Church might have remained such a school if it had not used its power for political ends.

In the depths of every soul there is always some religion, and for this reason, according to Maurice de Fleury, “modern thinkers who have lost their faith, and believe only in the freedom of the human will, end by drawing near again to the teachings of the church.”

Rational morality, the result of the cultivation of the mind, suffices for the strong. It soothes them with a thousand illusions and childish fancies; but it is true, too, that even among past masters in science, art or

politics there may be minds excitable or lacking in emotional "self-control," who must reinforce themselves by religious sentiment.

No matter what we may say, the "masses" must be considered a "majority of inferiors." Quite independently a "superior minority" stands forth, divested of anything dogmatic but all the same dedicated to a sort of personal religion, that is to say, an ethical intelligence, from which rational morality proceeds.

Take, for instance, the case of an apostle. The inferiority of his disciples is evident, but as these disciples advance in their spiritual education, they in their turn will become preachers and there will be moral equality in the group, so that the formation of other groups in turn will come about.

And so it is necessary to give the masses a religion that will be a substitute for moral law, one capable of reviving in them the hope of a better life, one that will comfort them

in affliction, and curb their passions. For the rest, religious beliefs are nothing but poetic materializations of true morality. The maturing of the soul of the populace contributing its share, instruction doubling itself by finish, the people of the future will not need dogmas other than that natural article of faith in oneself without which knowledge can not be acquired.

The moment religion no longer prescribes our laws it becomes useless. For many people it is already a dead letter. There is nothing to be said, I repeat, on the subject of those who regulate their own moral code on laws of reason, but what a misfortune is the disappearance of religion in the case of inferior intelligences which, without precepts and examples, cannot distinguish freely between right and wrong.

Among certain nations the philosophers founded a religion as long ago as 500 years B. C. Did not Confucius reform his coun-

try—reorganize justice and establish a code of ethics that has greatly promoted the national prosperity?

Making himself the authorized chief of a new sect, he organized a system of upright living that has made itself felt to this day.

The same thing will come about later in our occidental countries, but until then, as long as we have not replaced the ancient beliefs by any new ideal of morality, the people, great unconscious force that they yet remain, will require religious instruction as before.



The Press





The Press

THE newspaper, says Eugene Tavernier, is the pulse of society. There is a fundamental truth in that, but it is singularly less true than it used to be. The press as a whole no longer plays the rôle of social educator. It has become completely secularized, and is consequently no longer in a position to put forth any real moral influence.

The fact that it sells itself brazenly to whomsoever subsidizes it, puts it in the position frequently of attacking the weak and blindly supporting the strong and influential—a kind of persecution and injustice that he who runs may read.

Existing conditions have maimed the original character of the newspaper. In the hands of men more solicitous of their personal interests than zealous for the welfare of their country or in the search for truth, the press has sacrificed everything to business. Money is its main object. Newspapers are bazaars in which everything is for sale, not excluding defamation of our enemy's character, if we wish it. Moreover the enterprising promoter has made of the newspaper man a purveyor of sensational news, of paradoxes that mislead public opinion, of information as deceitful as it is ready. The result, curiously enough, in our democratic times, when everyone claims the right of liberty of speech, is the very opposite—that most journalists write not freely, but under orders, following the mournful trade of impersonal machines.

Writers worthy of the name, the moment they realized that they must bow to the wish-

es of mere dealers in soiled paper, ceased to contribute to the daily journals.

The overproduction of newspapers increases steadily, and the success of many an enterprise based on the exploitation of credulity, or the fear of scandal, or on outlandish advertising, is very often in inverse ratio to its real worth, so that whole legions of ignorant people, Jacks of all trades, have taken refuge in journalism, earning a living by the products of stupidity. On the morrow of the Commune, Louis Veuillot said of the press: "I have been associated with it all my life, and I do not like it; I might say that I hate it; but it belongs to the respectable order of necessary evils. Newspapers have grown so dangerous that there is greater safety in a greater number of them. The press can be resisted only by the force of its own numbers. Let us add torrent to torrent, and let them drown each other there in one swamp, or let us say, one sea. A swamp

has its lagoons, and the sea its moments of slumber. Let us see if we cannot build some Venice there. . . .”

Bold controversialist and stubborn fighter that he was, Veuillot did not foresee that the press, far from losing force through numbers, would rather constitute a state within a state, and arrive at such a point and be so strongly tinged with corrosive elements, that it would be dangerous both to individuals and to society.

It may be urged against me that, modest as were its beginnings in the days of Louis XIV, the press was as redoubtable under the Revolution as it became later, and that all regimes have suffered from it. But I answer that the vocation of journalism, notwithstanding its excesses, was once a veritable priesthood, justifying itself by talent and sincerity. There was a time when editors had fixed opinions, and fought under the same flag with others of their faith.

Nowadays we see them shifting from one party to another, now defending certain views and now others diametrically opposed to them.

In the field of criticism it was once a point of honor to show oneself capable of æsthetic appreciation. The Theophile Gautiers, the Sainte Beauves, the Paul de Saint-Victors, set little store by their personal preferences when it came to rendering homage to talent, from whatever source it came.

Art was a prime consideration for natures such as these. To-day empty talkers, interested in all sorts of shady schemes, freely puff up any mediocrity to whom they may be in debt. Everything is arranged by a system of foregone conclusions. The artist is treated as an enemy if he asserts his independence and will not call at the cashier's desk with the price of eulogies and genuflexions. In politics it is the same; whoever, in commerce or industry, does not sacrifice

to that omnipotent god Publicity, is checkmated by an opposition generously supplied with banknotes.

And so it happens, even in a free country, that a kind of privileged class, recruited for the most part from the failures and intellectual charlatans, is enabled to place itself above the law—the spreading of slander, it seems, being regarded only as one way of teaching and amusing the public.

Not long ago there was an outcry over the censorship of the press as being an abuse of power; then the freedom of voicing even subversive opinions was granted and liberty at once became license. . . And indeed to-day controversial tricks and vulgarity have become so great an evil that the least informed readers, those who scarcely ever read a page, know in advance what will be served up to them in politics, art, science, or the base coin of public scandal.

Moreover, the idea of advertising has so

increased that half the time a newspaper article extolling anyone has been paid for by the subject of it. Falsehood, under a thousand different guises, is distributed every day to a host of poor souls that never know the difference.

No, before the press can really teach the people or lead the masses, it must acquire some social, moral and political creed, some ideal, frankly sincere and personal, of the general æsthetic fitness of things. Every opinion that comes from a mind honest and frank and independent of commercial interests can not help making itself felt sooner or later in any society, and that, too, without injury to any individual interests or any useless stirring up and agitation of the public.

Most important of all, if this is to be brought about, every newspaper must be endowed with substantial capital, raised by independent stockholders, honorable men whose fortunes and social positions, rather

than bargaining and compromise, shall be security for success.

Established on a solid and durable basis such as this, the press, notwithstanding natural differences of opinion, devoted rather to the awakening of intelligence than to satisfying morbid curiosity, will become an admirable instrument for the distribution of knowledge.

For the diffusion of thought, we need zeal and eclecticism, not greed and blackmail.

Once the press frees itself from humbug, talented writers in every field will bring it the tribute of their observations, thoughts and labors; and a newspaper can then stand forth untrammeled by political parties or social combinations or individual interests; because the press will then represent the combined efforts of men well-to-do and educated, worthy of their office, and fitted to conduct it as a healthy, honest and meritorious enterprise.



Morality



Morality

MORALITY is that branch of metaphysics by the aid of which the rules of conduct imposed by custom seek to justify themselves; and in most cases it is a question not of licenses but of constraint. Morality is a science, some will tell you; it is an art, say others; for many idealists it is still a substitute for reason. M. Rodrigues sees in it the "will" which binds itself and is bound by others. "Individual freedom," he says, "if there be such a thing, plays but a secondary part, is practically an insignificant thing, if we consider humanity as a whole. Inseparable organi-

cally from the individual, interrelated still more closely with society, the psychological or moral thing called the conscience, when it draws upon itself for spiritual guidance, finds there only the sum of its surrounding influences. It represents a system of ideas, to the formation of which it has itself contributed but a feeble part. Besides, morality has undergone an evolution in every way parallel with that of science."

Beyond a doubt, yes; morality, like everything else that pertains to manners and customs, social laws and rites and traditions, ancestral prejudices, and the desire for liberty and individual rights, has undergone a constant evolution in accordance with its environment.

We are very far to-day from that Kantian morality that legislated for a being of ideal reason and imposed the same duties upon all alike.

After the morality of Epictetus, which

rested on the idea of liberty, and taught that a man could free himself from all dependence on other men or on nature, and attain to absolute liberty, by distinguishing between the things subject to him and those that are not, and discarding the latter as of no account; after the morality of Epicurus which held that pleasure is man's sovereign good, and counselled us to put forth all efforts in its pursuit provided only that it was as much a matter of joyousness of heart and mind as of the senses—modern morality is a thing of sects and classes entirely, differing according to the prejudices of the class that practices it.

The moral code of the middle classes consists mainly in preserving the unity of the community, regardless of individual liberty. The middle class family being a sort of commercial association, its morals are limited to an idea of standing by one another, and above all defending the community interests.

It is a restricted morality, imposing the rule of unity on all, and its value is relative rather than absolute.

The moral code of the aristocracy consists in preserving untarnished on its coat of arms that gilt which it considers of so much importance. It matters not in what way the escutcheon gains in brilliancy, because pride in it is a virtue just the same. Repeated gildings do not distress the aristocratic conscience, the chief duty of an aristocrat being to keep up appearances. All in all, such a moral code is no more unsound in itself than the middle class conception. One is the conservation of appearances as the other is that of selfish interests.

The moral code of Royal Courts implies the preservation and perpetuation of Court traditions. It does not hesitate to sacrifice individuals to this one unchanging and imperious cause. It is an exceptional morality, that of Courts, above right and beyond duty.

But just as the middle classes must have some sound commercial or industrial support, and the aristocracy the brilliancy, spurious or authentic, of its coat of arms, and Court circles the halo of descent, factitious though it be, from some particular stock, so must class morality cede day by day to circumstances and yield to varying situations.

Morality, being one of the great manifestations of human activity, must perforce obey the law of life and change from age to age. It must adapt itself to successive fashions and conditions. Personal interests, egotism, pride of birth, ideas of super-humanity, must, despite all rules, adapt themselves to the new conceptions of altruism and idealism; for there is no fixed morality.

Though it is true that every man carries within himself his own morality, he must remember, too, that the ratification of his moral judgments by others is one of the most important duties of civilization, and one,

too, which in our day he must discharge on rational principles.

Nothing perverts men more than letting themselves grow envious of socially harmful things or persons.

The personal interests of a merchant do not adapt themselves to those of the workman, coats of arms create no envy in the minds of artisans; the right called "divine" in no wise curtails the rights of the populace. On the other hand, sectarian morality is often the foe of new ideas of morality arising from new social needs; and for that reason can not expect to preserve its primitive significance, because humanity is constantly struggling toward an ideal which, though it renews and changes constantly in accordance with the difficulties of its path, tends steadily toward equity and light.

The Fear of Ridicule



The Fear of Ridicule

FEAR of ridicule is a terrible and powerful weapon against many people. Skillfully handled by devotees of fashion and convention it weakens the courage of their convictions and turns them oftentimes against their own best interests.

Many people of uncertain social standing or undeveloped moral strength, embitter their days by worrying over what others may say about them.

If they could only see that nothing simple and sincere can be ridiculous, if vanity and

self-love did not prevent them from realizing that criticism is inevitable, that with well-balanced people it not only increases confidence but oftentimes helps in the attainment of their special ends, then not only would the testimony of others have no terrors for them, but they would themselves no longer try to efface their neighbor's characters in the welter of social conventionalities.

With Emerson they would say: "What I ought to do is the thing that concerns me, not what people think I should do."

They would remember these words of Bruyère: "'To do as others do' is a maxim to be regarded with suspicion. The moment we apply it to other than merely external and inconsequential things, to minor matters of custom, fashion, or propriety, it nearly always means that we must do what is wrong."

A modern thinker, writing anonymously, has remarked with some spirit: "If one

wishes to be a good-fellow, even with those who are not so themselves, must he cease to be himself? Good-fellowship carried to this excess is nothing but foolishness and fraud. What on earth becomes of your self-respect on such occasions? Dare then, to say what you think, if you do think." And I, on my part must add: Dare to do whatever seems to you good, useful, or reasonable: avoid foregone conclusions: be not influenced by the opinions of others; think independently: take your own worth into the account: exert all your foresight when you encounter strange ideas: impose silence on your self-conceit:—in a word, drive from you that fear of ridicule, which, carried to excess, may completely shatter your ambitions or ruin your noblest hopes, quenching the budding of your happiness and success. What is this cringing reverence for *what people do*, this absurd fear of *what is not done?* Why this folly of imitation, this constraint

of conscience? Do we not eat and drink what we please? Whence comes it, then, that our public acts are tainted with hypocrisy? Why this eternal bowing to appearances, this slavery to conventions that cramp our minds and hearts?

In the social world fear of being laughed at goes to absurd lengths: a man will actually break an important appointment, even though it were one from which he expected some considerable moral or material good, rather than appear without the accoutrements which the world considers proper—rather than present himself without the hat or the shoes which snobbery for the moment has prescribed.

Women, in whom fear of ridicule is so strong and so closely bound up with momentary whims, will risk their health rather than appear unfavorably in other women's eyes. If fashion decree that a summer gown be worn, they will risk bronchitis and all its con-

sequences rather than wear something else; in winter the same thing; at all costs they must not think with their own minds, or feel with their own hearts, or live according to their own means, or strength, or reason!

A strange disease indeed is this passive submission to the dictates of fashion. Foolishness, however, is of all time, and Montaigne in his day truly expressed the same situation: "Almost all our opinions are taken on trust. . . We are all richer than we think, but we are trained to borrow and to search for other things; we are led to use another rather than to rely upon ourselves. . . We neither test our faculties nor understand them; we invest ourselves with those of others, and let our own grow rusty."

Yes, truly the fear of ridicule is one of the worst possible defects in people's training: it causes mistakes that are irreparable, destroys character, brings all originality to naught.

How many marriages that should have been happy have turned out badly, though quite unnecessarily, on account of inequality in income, age, or birth! For even upon the pursuit of happiness, that eternal law of nature, the fear of ridicule casts its blighting influence.

It is with the fear of ridicule as it is with morality; each man should base his acts on things worth while, throw off constraint, be, in a word, himself, independent of circumstances and custom, experience and reason teaching him to maintain the balance between his personal privileges and his conscience.



Public Opinion



Public Opinion

 T is easy in the world to live according to the ways of the world, says Emerson; and in solitude to live according to oneself. But the great man is he who in the world lives according to the ideals of his solitude.

This argument of the master supplies us with the hint that self-confidence based on thorough-going education and a wide range of experience is the best rule of conduct one can follow.

He who is a slave to public opinion lives an inconclusive life, because, not being mas-

ter of himself, incapable of self-control, he has no opinions of his own.

To bow to public opinion is to abandon in advance all effort at right thinking, to abdicate one's special rights, to be nothing but a pale reflection of life, an anomaly.

To set oneself above public opinion, however, is not possible for everyone; since not everyone, indeed few people, can throw off cheerfully the conventions of society.

One of the conditions of being independent of public opinion is to need no moral or material help from any one. I do not speak of those free and independent souls upon whom fortune has smiled from the moment of their birth, but of the great majority who through lack of natural stability and well seasoned temperament must blindly follow the course in life laid down for them.

What is public opinion if not a collection of widely generalized opinions, rules of ac-

cepted usage, hypocritical virtues, falsehoods in disguise? And why should I not have opinions of my own, even if they fly in the face of the public, when I am conscious of rectitude and good sense in my intentions, and let my conduct and beliefs stand for themselves and whatever they are worth?

Will public opinion accept any responsibility for my mistakes? Will the exception prove the rule? Shall I be less worthy, less just or faithful, for breaking loose from imitation, reflection and affectation?

Why, then, should I deprive myself of honest happiness under the pretext that public opinion is against me?

Why should I bow to circumstances not of my own making? In short, why should I not be myself?

The craving for general approbation is a sign of weakness, a vice of the spirit and the conscious self. It is as if you should authorize other people to prescribe your

duties for you, and impose on you their own preconceived ideas and dogmas, their neutral notions of what is right; as if they should limit you to their cult of *good actions* and *fine words* instead of letting you develop a system of your own.


Misfortunes come to those who submit to such contaminating influence. They doom themselves to a life of mental misery; they drag out an everlasting existence in indecision, that cowardice of the soul, never realizing that it is with public opinion as with the moral code, that each according to national environment, heredity and education is mean or arbitrary or intolerant.

The decrees of public opinion are always scornful and presumptuous. They are not the result of any harmony between the preaching and the practice of those who make them; and so we should show ourselves for what we are, speak our own language with sincerity, express our thoughts without

circumlocution, to-day, to-morrow and the day after to-morrow! for even if we contradict ourselves on certain points we only prove by that our power of adaptation to what is right and best. Let us be loyal to ourselves, for only in that way may we conquer that secret of subtle personality that fortifies us against our neighbor.

A persevering and well-tempered spirit, a sound mind given to quiet meditation and reflection, a conscience refined by education —these make a character that laughs easily at the bugaboo of public opinion, and finds its way unharmed through every walk of life.

This state of individualism does not mean that we must oppose ourselves systematically to all the habits of our age, or set ourselves up as foes to accepted truth; but only that, shaking the yoke of public opinion from our shoulders, we ought in all gentility to make our own opinions felt.



Prejudice



Prejudice

SO the number of prejudices, which are opinions adopted without any previous examination of their accuracy, there is no end. Like religion, prejudice is the leprosy of weak minds, which accept without demur moral laws that are only relative, dogmas that have no sanction in reason, and errors which live and propagate more vigorously than truth.

There are persons lacking in judgment and discernment who endeavor to do as the world does, simply because they are not

strong enough to have opinions of their own, or pause for reflection, or to consider their own actions and acknowledge the folly of their weaknesses.

Undeniably, those whose minds have been exercised in the play of ideas are with difficulty reconciled to prejudice. Since their judgment is free, they demand complete freedom of action, and consider it intolerable that a multitude of petty obligations should interfere with their views and methods of thought.

Prejudice—a kind of mental aberration—is a means by which the less intelligent assume to measure the ability of others. Prejudice, too, the outcome of foolish habits, absurd fears and silly superstitions, is the cause of many troublesome convictions. It is, for example, a popular belief that the number thirteen is unlucky, that the song of a night-bird forebodes death; that three lights bring misfortune; but, in another



sphere of thought, the belief is no less general that persons of exalted birth must inevitably be lacking in the higher kinds of intelligence. It is a foregone conclusion that they are incapable of intellectual achievement, only fitted to shine in a society as superficial as it is useless. Let these people actually devote themselves to serious work in literature or art, and their detractors will insist it is most improbable, nay, actually impossible for them to accomplish anything, high birth being such a notorious warrant of incapacity.

Thus, just as prejudice in the form of convention in thought and habit dominates the timid soul, so it rules out in advance the proof of intellect, and blights a reputation.

In frivolous society, prejudice is particularly ineradicable. It creeps into conversation, and in the sphere of compliment and polite phrase reveals itself in all its naked ugliness.

Let some keen mind appear upon the scene, to pierce a prejudice to the quick, and it will resist until its disturber is compelled to depart. The result of folly and of fear, prejudice is a parasite springing from the brain and has been grafted through the centuries from one ignorance upon another.

Prejudice, still abundant in our time, attacks everything—art, science, law, individual liberty, conscience, truth.

In sectarian circles is it not considered indisputable that the Jew is incapable of high intellectual achievements? Yet, during the past twenty-five years the drama has furnished astounding proofs of the falsehood of this assertion. And the scientist—despite all his knowledge has contributed to the world, do not the prejudiced, who see in him an offender against divinity, still regard him as an enemy?

In many instances is not the education of the people considered a social danger? Are

—

—

not new laws designed to guarantee justice to everyone regarded as monstrous? Yet now that a humane conscience has been developed, now that the will has gone to school to equity, now that the notion of personal responsibility has found a place in our code of manners, and moral education has become rationalistic, it is really strange to see persons who not only pretend themselves to the possession of intelligence, but are accepted by others as possessing well-stocked minds, easily swallow each absurdity and prejudice of the moment.


Women, it must be said, are for the most part enemies of progress. Through atavism and habit, they give themselves up to prejudice with a kind of frenzy that captivates their superficial souls. Two pernicious factors assist in this: jealousy and envy. And prejudiced men are no less dangerous, because they cannot reason by themselves and are not willing to follow the judgment of

others, and are unable thus to correct their faults.

From all this, I sometimes think that all slaves of prejudice should be compelled to live by themselves, separated from the rest of the world that is living and thinking rightly; until the time came when, dissatisfied with themselves, they might make themselves endurable to others.



Judgment





Judgment

JUDGMENT, essentially a function of the intelligence, is the ability to discern ideas, to establish just comparisons between things as they really are and things as they appear to be. But as the faculty of perception varies according to the nature of the social situation, it is hardly possible to formulate a fixed rule of judgment, even though in every case it requires an affirmation. To whatever degree our judgment may be cultivated, it can not be safely brought to bear upon another with-

out applying in our own case first the principle of Know Thyself. That antique apothegm, grown somewhat trite now from the unmeaning way in which it has been handed down from generation to generation, is, nevertheless, for the chosen few, superior to any other. Obviously, one must place direct appeal to knowledge beyond all else. Without it, as Nicati has said: "A man who neglects to question himself, strips himself of all personality, and counts for no more in the scheme of things than inert matter, which has at least the faculty of resistance."

He who lives according to his conscience, and follows his own moral law, should be satisfied. Sitting in judgment on himself he knows well enough whether he has conformed to the standards he has set himself. And so we must ever seek within ourselves the perfect judgment, recalling those beautiful words of Thomas à Kempis:

“Have always a good eye to thyself, and beware thou judge not lightly other men. In judging other men a man oft laboureth in vain, oft erreth, and lightly offendeth God: but in judging himself and his own deeds, he always laboureth fruitfully and to his ghostly profit.”

Always, in judging ourselves, we should abide, as strictly and logically as our nature will permit, by the rules of truth and reason. It is to be noted that wit and good memories are not always the best instruments for exact and learned judgment; assimilation is the enemy of reflection, and remembrance is not thought.

When we have set our own ideas in order, we shall not judge others without taking into consideration the reasons that may have actuated them, what motives, what circumstances may insensibly have modified their estimate of what was right or wrong. So doing we shall be more kindly, and avoid

those wrongs that spring from injustice and false judgment.

Our own morality does not hold us always completely under control; it is easy for a man to yield to the temptation to absolve himself from sin. And so it is but right that the notion of what is predetermined supply a motive for indulgence toward our fellow creatures.

To be indulgent in particular cases we must know our own failings, and not condemn others for what may seem like error in our eyes only.

The first requisite of clear, sane judgment is always to take into account one's mental life, to confess to oneself one's various moods, and combat ceaselessly the evil within us.


From the point of view of altruism, we must consider the person we are judging in the light of his environment and circumstances, difficult as it is to appreciate the various degrees in character and in sensi-

tiveness, according to which the deed was done. That is why historians, at the height even of great synthetic activity, so often record wrong judgments of the past. In their desire to make their characters live again, to evoke once more the days that have gone, they take a part themselves in it all, and love or hate what they should merely appraise dispassionately. They lack tolerance and indulgence simply from following their own opinions. They do not measure the men of old according to the morals of their age, but judge a whole community by a few isolated documents, and declare that such and such men of bygone times were mediocre. And yet the truth is that there are no greater men to-day than have lived in any other ages of the world. Twenty-two centuries away the men of Plutarch stand out as much admired as any of our modern heroes. And in the realm of science, of religion, or of philosophy, man has only changed the

names of things without in any manner altering the nature of judgment or of logic, the conditions of happiness or the visible aspects of courage;—without having wrought a change in any way within the human *ego*.



Moral Courage





Moral Courage

MORAL courage is that special force or energy of character which drives us to avow and fight for those things in which we believe. It is a quality, perhaps the rarest in man, that is indispensable to a public man, be he statesman, military man, or artist, and especially to the writer, who must assume responsibility and mould opinion.

I have often heard it said that moral courage is commensurate with physical development. That is true enough if physical de-

velopment be accompanied by perfect health. Often we see men, puny in appearance, possessed of moral courage denied to the finest athletes, if despite the meanness of their persons, they rejoice in a robust health which relieves them of all mental languor and gives them a perfect balance.

But we may go still further. Although there may be no scientific method of making character, it is certain that we may, by an exercise of the right instincts and inclinations and a careful selection of our ideas and actions, cultivate moral courage in ourselves. Never has the necessity for the formation of character been more imperative than in our own times. Character becomes rare as the intellect becomes disordered. Dilettantism kills reason, estheticism wanders without logic in the field of ideas, prejudice takes the place of reflection, caprice dictates moral and material interests and undermines the will.

The essence of the individual, his dominant trait, is his character, and character begets moral courage. Dr. Ferrand declares that "character is of the greatest importance in the life of the individual and in the life of those groups into which individuals band themselves by natural and social laws: the one great power, says Smiles, in the world. It is by his oneness of purpose that the man of character becomes not only master of himself, perhaps a great enough thing to have accomplished, but also controls the drift of all those within his influence, as a great battleship attracts the smaller craft."

And there is another thing, too. Acting in unison with the intellectual force that guides our thoughts and actions is sentiment, the sensibility that ought to enlighten the judgment, the thought that fixes the responsibility. The man who is governed by his own feelings uncontrolled by reason is guilty of many an error of judgment and

allows himself by just that weakness sometimes to be unjust as well as untrue. Justice, let us not forget, is Truth applied to the conduct of life. It is this very lack of the idea of justice in the modern conscience that brings us daily face to face with the breakdown of moral courage, whether it was offensive or defensive in the conflict.

Politics of late, and the arts and letters as well, have furnished us with many a sad example of such failures of moral courage. Literary and musical criticism is conspicuous by its venality; science itself is not exempt from methods which reason rejects, nor is it to private education alone that we can attribute a taint of laxity in moral courage. It is indeed this blind lack of moral courage that has transformed liberty into revolting bondage.

Examine parliaments, study castes, dissect governing bodies, and you will see that characters worthy to be the inspirers of the

Good, the Beautiful and the True, are swamped by a mass of characters who seek to run the public conscience to their own interest and aggrandizement.

It is the moral courage of the individual which makes for the greatness of a people. But that particular kind of courage, because each is losing his sense of responsibility, and beginning to forget justice and truth, is disappearing, little by little, from the world. How few men we see using their authority to redeem a wrong or punish a lying villainy, or attempting to correct a false judgment! Thoughtlessness, hesitation, doubt, lack of initiative, indifference, have ousted moral courage. And that through faulty education of character.

For, as Emerson says:


“No change of circumstances can repair a defect of character. What have I gained, that I no longer immolate a bull to Jove or to Neptune, or a mouse to Hecate; that I do

not tremble before the Eumenides, or the Catholic Purgatory, or the Calvinistic Judgment-day,—if I quake at opinion, the public opinion as we call it; or at the threat of assault, or contumely, or bad neighbors, or poverty, or mutilation, or at the rumor of revolution, or of murder? If I quake, what matters it what I quake at?"

Each one of us in his own sphere of action, must decide (no matter how it may affect him personally) what is just, and shirk no struggle in the defense of the public honor, and fight every cowardly opinion which attacks his own reason as well as the liberty of the individual.



Tradition





Tradition

TRADITION is the link which unites the present with the past, and causes the transmission of vague remembrances across the ages, facts founded perhaps on real bases but broadened and distorted by the popular mind in its groping for the ideal.

Tradition is many sided, essentially pagan or religious. Ordinarily it shows itself in a blind respect for established institutions, a thoughtless veneration for familiar symbols; it is the mark of the passive attitude of the

feeble human soul dominated by superstition.

It is to certain mental organizations of the lowest order that tradition, as absolute dogma, appeals.

The inclination to trust to tradition implies an abject obedience to usage, as well as a need of some sort of moral order or cult, and it is that which hampers the development of such thought as makes her progress.

In every age, from the time when stories were handed down by word of mouth from one generation to another, tradition has been regarded as truth. That which may be a true account at the time of the happening of the event, may hardly be such after the lapse of considerable time. First causes become twisted in the handling, and a false interpretation is inevitable.

Locke with much reason says:

“The being and existence of the thing itself is what I call the original truth. A

credible man vouching his knowledge of it is a good proof: but if another equally credible do witness it from his report, the testimony is weaker; and a third that attests the hearsay of an hearsay, is yet less considerable. So that, in traditional truths, each remove weakens the force of the proof; and the more hands the tradition has successively passed through, the less strength and evidence does it receive from them."

That is why tradition, from whatever source it springs, constitutes for many a false cause, the more dangerous as it seems incontestable. After the establishment of Christianity, tradition had all the value of an idealism capable of nourishing individual action; under its many forms it invoked a respect for great moralizing acts, it drew closer the ties of family (the Birth of Christ is an example) it cemented friendships, put a value on the idea of reward for good actions as well as penalties for bad, created

a relation between justice and fear and joy and hope. As times improved the idea of Personality developed, social differences became greater, and tradition adapted itself to the various social groups, the simple finding consolation in the one, the priest and law-maker power in the other. Centuries passed, altering manners, changing beliefs, modifying appetites and desires. In the change, tradition as a force grew weaker.

Even in our days we observe many an old tradition, but since every social movement makes for a freer conscience, just so does it weaken tradition until tradition becomes little more than a red letter Fête day on a calendar. In spite of the fact that certain classes, as such, uphold traditions, the evolution of the masses effaces the useless ones. The outcome is happy, for, and I repeat it, tradition is the enemy of progress in that it dominates knowledge and social duty.



The weakness of pagan and religious tradition is to-day apparent enough. Thus, for example, have we allowed to fall into desuetude the celebration of the anniversaries of the death of our loved ones. No longer, even in Latin countries, where civilization is backward, are we apt to see the family of the deceased swathe themselves in crépe on the fated day and from midnight to midnight bewail the departed. On the contrary, this family tradition has so far lost its portent that the mourners hesitate not to dance and be gay from the moment the set period of mourning has elapsed. That anomaly is common in Spain even now. Deprive tradition of these outward excrescences and it dies a lingering but natural death.

Rapidly are disappearing the traditions which held the villager in bondage. Where are to-day the long processions blessing the fields, the files of patron saints, the ques-

tionings of the fountain,—all the remains of the old beliefs? Where are now, as in Greece of old, the bottles in which, upon the day of a funeral, each collected his tears? Man, conscious of his might and right, has freed himself of a thousand obligations sprung from the fear which numbs his will. That is why those believers in tradition who still struggle for the maintenance of ignorance in the poor and lowly and of power in those of higher place, occupy a position as difficult as it is untenable. It is a useless task, for it is the people themselves who are the real sustainers or demolishers of tradition, and the people no longer uphold traditions that are without some use or value to themselves.



Criticism



Criticism



RITICISM, in the larger sense, is the free exercise of the judgment. Alike in literary, artistic and intellectual analysis, that is to say in the study of beauty, in philosophy, history and philology, and in the experimental and mathematical sciences, criticism is essential, for it brings out the value of conceptions and achievements. But this same criticism strikes terror into many hearts; it thwarts the actions of many persons and paralyzes their wills. Against this evil, which is far too common to-day, we must contend, for it is no more

the part of wisdom to invite criticism as a means to notoriety than to make a bugaboo of it and avoid it through wounded pride.

I maintain that the expression of an opinion opposed to our own should not logically lessen our efforts, destroy our ambitions, or force us into hypocrisy.

An excellent way to avoid the fear of criticism from another is to subject oneself to self-criticism, which is the hardest form of all to practise, but also the most profitable.

Through this kind of mental training we are enabled to discover more easily the motives of external criticism, and either to scorn the jealousy or envy which has inspired it, or to benefit by the advice which springs from an honest perception of our qualities and defects.

A critic, if he is sincere, affirms only what he perceives clearly. His personal evidence becomes the warrant of his sincerity.

But, you will say, criticism is frequently

the outcome of a rigorous morality. . . . Would you have it the outcome of a culpable leniency? When it is rigorous it is a factor in self-control; lenient to excess, it can only develop vanity. The mission of criticism is not to determine our actions, but to judge them according to its own standards. In the case of a writer, a painter, or a musician, for example, it is obvious that at bottom criticism is only dealing with a matter of taste. If it attempts to destroy what is worthy, it dishonors itself, and to just that extent renders itself useless; if it bestows praise, it can only explain it on the ground of personal judgment.

In private, the critic of our actions, deliberate or impulsive, is an inquisitive being peering through the veil of circumstance into the windows of our souls, and of course, unable to see clearly. The dreary experiences of such a critic are not worth stopping to listen to.

In short, when we are conscious of the beauty of our achievements, of the purity of our intentions, the dignity of our actions, or the simple pleasure of our thoughts, let us leave criticism to its work and follow our own path.

Naturally, this does not mean that we must despise judicious criticism; for just as in politics an opposition is essential to the free public discussion of a proposed measure, so in private life criticism is a spur to emulation and a help to us in attaining the goal we have set before us.



*The Danger of Excessive
Analysis*





The Danger of Excessive Analysis



F there are not a few who cherish an unbounded admiration for synthetics, there are many whom the passion for analytics drives to the limits of exaggeration.

Surely, if we would escape useless scruples, as well as irrational desires, we must ceaselessly examine our consciences; surely, it is a good thing to keep in mind the consequences, near or remote, of our actions; surely, too, we ought by sincerely searching out the secret springs which actuate us to correct our mistakes and taste the savour of our

good actions, as well as make use of past experience to achieve at last real ethical culture.

To examine and analyse oneself, to develop one's ideal, to bow to the law of mentality is to perfect oneself in that code of morals which every man should possess within himself.

On the other hand, if, driven by logic, we make a too minute analysis of our actions, we run the risk of upsetting the balance of our reasoning; and if we analyse in the same fashion exterior influences, we find ourselves invalidating our best actions by false estimates that only weaken the spirit.

By setting aside half formed ideas from the general, comprehensive idea, by ignoring the relation of each little action to the completed whole, we lose the sense of real analysis, mistaking quantity for quality, just as we lose in the microscope our sense of proportion. Enlarged and developed, little de-

—

—

fective nothings stamp themselves on our mental vision, destroying the harmony and beauty of our conception in its entirety.

I do not deny that to be morally great we must think great things; I know that accomplishment is proportionate to the moral force expended, I am well aware that we must be ever on the watch; but I do insist that a habit of analysing excessively our trifling daily acts and our great moral deeds as well, numbs the determining faculty, hampers our judgment of ourselves and of our neighbors, and tends to vitiate our minds.

Do you examine too closely the motives which determine men's actions? Then you either mistake their moral reason or mar their beauty, and you suffer doubly for them and for yourself.

An example: "Have I," you may say to yourself, "done right in giving this money in charity?" If, step by step, you argue that the object of your charity was unworthy and


unappreciative, that your action thus was useless, you may end by regret at having yielded to an altruistic impulse; and so deprive yourself of an instinctive joy and satisfaction, besides conveying to other people, quite unjustly, the impression that you lack feeling.

One might cite endless examples:—by excessive analysis we may turn an act of devotion into one of egoism in its narrowest sense, an explanation of a base action into an excuse for it, a certitude into an hypothesis, a sincere affection into a selfish farce. All that as regards others; as regards ourselves, we shall be drifting into hesitation, into a confounding of our spontaneous ideas, into faulty ways of thinking, into constant uneasiness and lasting discontent.


I speak only of the abuse of analysis, for normal analysis has its proper place in one's mental existence, especially if it is practised in a well-ordered and synthetic way.

"However unnecessary we may consider analysis in many ways," says Paulhan, "it is in certain things of the first importance. It is analysis which dominates the minds of those who lack the synthetic faculty; who must trust to analysis for clear vision, and in good part for their understanding of the motives of others. It is on analysis, too, that Memory, or the memory which segregates ideas from impressions, is founded. The same is true of criticism, knowledge and appreciation of art, of science or philosophy.

Certain kinds of minds, with sensitiveness, receptiveness and caution in their composition, may well have the analytical faculty developed to an unusual degree. Beyond that I contend that analysis is dangerous. Analysis is mainly useful as it limits itself to precision and finesse, to depth rather than to shallowness in thought.



The Law of Compensation





The Law of Compensation

WHEN, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Azaïs published his "Compensations of Human Destiny," he propounded, in principle, this theory: "The destiny of man, considered in its entirety, is the work of nature as a whole, and all men are equal before that destiny."

La Rochefoucauld, long before, had said: "Whatever differences there may be between fates there is a certain compensation in good and equal which makes them more or less alike." A belief in the law of compensation

leads to the highest kind of optimism. No matter how far many system-makers may have advanced, always a law of compensation is at work among peoples as well as persons, just as those who deplore an unhappy lot nevertheless taste the compensatory benefits of vigilance and courage.

The law of compensation is certainly one of the most consoling of beliefs, one of which every human soul should feel the influence.

We may well be surprised at Droz, when he says: "The absurd system of compensations must produce an inevitable apathy, a contempt for the woes of others, and the most odious egoism." To be convinced that sadness is only joy viewed from the seamy side, that suffering only makes us realize the better what health means to us, that remembrance doubles regret, does not prevent us, I feel sure, from sharing in the joys and sorrows of others.

On the other hand, altruism, in the practice

of which so few excel, is no more than an overdeveloped egoism—paradoxical as that may appear. Nietzsche says: “An altruistic attitude, one which has lost its egoism, is in every case an unfortunate thing. As with individuals, so it is with peoples. When a man begins to lose his *ego* he begins to lose his best instincts, and to choose by instinct that which is harmful under the belief that we are influenced by so-called ‘disinterested motives,’ is to be well on the road to decadence.”

Not to go so far as this master of aphorism, I maintain that egoism is not opposed to altruism, that the law of compensation does not produce egoism or selfishness.

When an action concerns ourselves alone, with no possible reference to others, egoism is useful and lawful. From that egoism itself springs the idea of compensation, for the incessant pursuit of happiness is after all the most lingering form of misery.

Hear Emerson on the subject: "The same dualism underlies the nature and condition of man. Every excess causes a defect; every defect an excess. Every sweet hath its sour; every evil its good. Every faculty which is a receiver of pleasure has an equal penalty put on its abuse. It is to answer for its moderation with its life. For every grain of wit there is a grain of folly. For everything you have missed, you have gained something else; and for everything you gain, you lose something."

Take the case of an ambitious man who has seized the reins of power and dominates a nation; surely he has more responsibilities than a humble workman. If he fail of his promises, or the realization of his own ideas, he is betrayed, degraded, and abandoned, while the workman lives his simple life with satisfaction, and the consciousness of having done what he set out to do.

Real happiness is something relative, de-

pending upon the classes and their conditions. Wealth can not shut the door on Death, and Poverty may know the joys of domestic love and hope. Let a tyrant impose himself upon a people and they will increase tenfold their powers of resistance; and deal a punishment that fits the crime. In the human soul exist all conditions. To submit to the law of compensation is not to escape one's destiny. To recognize the bad is to be assured that one may attain to better things. The man of feeling suffers from his sensibility, the wise man rejoices in his wisdom. The soul is tirelessly in search of what is good, right and just; it must live and have its being, in the most hopeless miseries or with the basest failures.

That is why the idea of Nemesis is eternal. All action involves some reaction, all sorrow and all joy have their rungs in the social ladder. The man born rich will suffer more by the loss of his fortune than the man who

loses what little he once had. The one has nothing of which to envy the other.

Burke somewhere says that no one may escape the injury of ever so little pride. The penalty of injustice is fear. Not to care has nothing to do with the law of compensation, for, without morality, mistakes have no excuse, and to repeat one's faults shows some failure of our reasoning powers.


At the same time, believing that an ill chance may be compensated by a happy one brings not the slightest relief to the spirit, if the spirit has made no effort toward the balance. A man must ever affirm his *ego* and keep his conscience on the watch to realize the compensation there may be for inequalities of condition.

Let the rich ride with the rich; if I am poor, I shall walk with the poor. That those who outstrip me in fortune and power are capable of love, does not prevent my loving, and my little sorrows and my little joys shall

be neither shallower nor less sweet than the grief and triumphs of the great.

Looking at life from this point of view one sees the law of compensation as the best and finest element in the formation of Character.







**THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY
REFERENCE DEPARTMENT**

**This book is under no circumstances to be
taken from the Building**

MAR 11 1956

1878 419

100
H

